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ABORTION TRAVEL AND THE LIMITS OF CHOICE 




American women have long had to travel to access abortion.  In the 
years prior to Roe v. Wade, at a time when a majority of states criminalized 
abortion, most laws targeted the providers of abortions or abortifacient 
drugs, rather than the women obtaining them.1  The punitive cost for 
women was instead lack of choice or exile: many had to leave their home 
jurisdictions to access services they were unable to receive locally. Women 
with the resources to do so travelled to Mexico, and even as far away as 
Japan, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, to terminate pregnancies.2  
Feminist networks and organizations assisted women with travel, while also 
working to change the restrictive laws that made these journeys necessary.3  
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Erdman, Gail Henderson, Josh Karton, Nicolas Lamp, Heidi Matthews, Cherie Metcalf, Patti Peppin, 
Darryl Robinson, Don Stuart, Jacob Weinrib, and Julian Wright for comments and discussions of earlier 
versions of this paper.  Rachel Hill and Alex Terrana provided stellar research assistance.  Thank you to 
Cyra Choudhury, the Florida International University Law Review, and in particular Gisselle Perez, for 
their extraordinary work in organizing this timely symposium issue.  I benefited greatly from the 
symposium event.  Finally, I am indebted to the many lawyers, advocates, and scholars from whom I 
learned a great deal about reproductive rights and justice during my postdoctoral fellowship at the 
Center for Reproductive Rights and Columbia Law School. 
1  Roe v. Wade, 401 U.S. 113 (1973); see Reva B. Siegel, Roe’s Roots: The Women’s Rights 
Claims that Engendered Roe, 90 B.U.L. REV. 1875, 1879 (2010) (discussing prosecutions of doctors 
who performed abortions in the years prior to Roe); see also LESLIE J. REAGAN, DANGEROUS 
PREGNANCIES: MOTHERS, DISABILITIES, AND ABORTION IN MODERN AMERICA 139–79 (2010) 
(discussing the prosecution of doctors providing abortions in California during a 1960s outbreak of 
German Measles and the ensuing backlash).  For a discussion of the more limited prosecution of women 
seeking abortions, see HEATHER D. BOONSTRA, RACHEL BENSON GOLD, CORY L. RICHARDS, & 
LAWRENCE B. FINER, Abortion in Women’s Lives, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE 11 (2006), 
https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/pubs/2006/05/04/AiWL.pdf; see also Samuel W. 
Buell, Note, Criminal Abortion Revisited, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1774, 1781 (1991). 
2  For a discussion of pre-Roe travel to Mexico and the role of feminist networks in travel and 
legal advocacy, see Leslie J. Reagan, Crossing the Border for Abortions: California Activists, Mexican 
Clinics, and the Creation of a Feminist Health Agency in the 1960s, 26 FEMINIST STUD. 331 (2000); see 
also“Rush” Procedure for Going to Japan, in BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICES THAT SHAPED THE 
ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING 8–11 (Reva B. Siegel & Linda Greenhouse 
eds., 2012) (describing “Rush” procedure for traveling to Japan to obtain an abortion). 
3  See, e.g., Statement of Ms. Pamela Lowry, Executive Committee Member of NARAL and 
Director of Constitutional Defense Project, Massachusetts to Senate Committee on the Judiciary (1975), 
in THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 47 (Eva R. Rubin, ed., 1994) (describing 
how Planned Parenthood workers in the mid-1960s assisted women with traveling abroad for abortion 
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Those without this help or sufficient means to travel often had no legal 
alternatives.  Groups such as the Abortion Counseling Service of Women’s 
Liberation, known as the Jane Collective, worked to fill these gaps by 
providing safe, but clandestine, terminations.4 
More recently, efforts to single out abortion for onerous regulation 
have again made travel both necessary and widespread in the United States. 
Successive waves of state and federal regulation have limited women’s 
ability to access abortion even as Roe remains on the books.5 Referred to by 
reproductive rights advocates as TRAP laws (“Targeted Regulation of 
Abortion Providers”), these regulations frequently require abortion 
providers to obtain privileges at local hospitals, outfit their clinics as 
ambulatory surgical centers, or pay higher licensing fees than providers of 
comparable medical services.6  Making the abortion right subject to death 
by a thousand cuts, burdensome regulations render abortion care more 
 
services: So Planned Parenthood, much against its wishes, found itself involved in referring cases for 
abortion out of the country and around the world.  In 1968 the British changed their laws.  They passed a 
fairly sweeping reform act.  It was a very, very liberal law.  The cost of going to London for an abortion 
was half that of Japan.  For $800 you could get on the plane and go and get legal medical care.  This 
opened up a tremendous—a flood gate of people who felt that they could somehow manage $800 and 
who came to Planned Parenthood for help and information.”). 
4  See LAURA KAPLAN, THE STORY OF JANE: THE LEGENDARY UNDERGROUND FEMINIST 
ABORTION SERVICE (1995); Ron Grossman, Before Roe v. Wade, the Jane Collective Served Chicago 
Women, CHI. TRIBUNE (Jan. 20, 2017, 8:53 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/com- 
mentarycommentary/ct-roe-wade-abortion-jane-collective-flashback-perspec-0122-jm-20170119-story. 
html. 
5  For a discussion of the tactical shifts of the anti-abortion movement, see Reva B. Siegel, 
Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 
1704 (2008);  more generally, see Reva B. Siegel, The Rights’ Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the 
Spread of Woman Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641 (2008) (analyzing the turn 
among anti-abortion groups away from fetal-protection tactics toward a discourse of protecting women’s 
health and decision-making). 
6  For discussion of TRAP laws and their role in the antiabortion strategy to both narrow Roe’s 
holding and reduce abortion access, see Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Casey and the Clinic 
Closings: When “Protecting Health” Obstructs Choice, 125 YALE L.J. 1428, 1444–49 (2016); see, e.g., 
Whole Women’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 681 (2014) (“If allowed to go into effect, the 
act’s ambulatory-surgical-center requirement will further reduce the number of licensed abortion-
providing facilities [in Texas] to, at most, eight.”); Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 760 F. 3d 
448, 457–58 (5th Cir. 2014) (“Under this formulation, [the clinic] has demonstrated a substantial 
likelihood of proving that H.B. 1390—effectively clos[es] the one abortion clinic in the state [of 
Mississippi].”), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2536 (2016); see also Manny Fernandez, Abortion Law Pushes 
Texas Clinics to Close Doors, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/07/us/citin- 
g-new-texas-rules-abortion-provider-is-shutting-last-clinics-in-2-regions.html (“Shortly before a candle 
light vigil on the sidewalk outside, employees of the last abortion clinic in the Rio Grande Valley in 
South Texas shut the doors early Thursday evening, making legal abortion unavailable in the poorest 
part of the state in the wake of tough new restrictions passed last year by the Texas Legislature. . . . 
There were 44 facilities that performed abortions in Texas in 2011, abortion providers said. After the 
two closings on Thursday, there are now 24, they said. When the law is fully implemented in September, 
that number is expected to drop to six.”). 
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costly and in many instances shutter clinics altogether.  States have 
defended these regulations by claiming that they protect women’s health.7  
Perhaps the most notorious recent example of such a law, Texas House Bill 
2 (“H.B. 2”) imposed strict admitting privileges and ambulatory surgical 
center requirements on abortion providers.  At the time the law passed, 
forty-one abortion clinics operated in Texas; enforcing the new 
requirements would have led to the closure of approximately three-quarters 
of those clinics, forcing women to travel ever further to access services.8  
The Supreme Court struck down much of H.B. 2 in the landmark case of 
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.9 
Called upon to review such laws, appellate courts and advocates have 
offered competing visions of abortion travel—its causes, meaning, and legal 
and political significance—in deciding the constitutional fate of 
contemporary abortion regulations.  In particular, they have divided over 
the question of how travel should figure into the “undue burden” analysis 
established in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey.10  Casey allows states to regulate abortion throughout pregnancy 
provided they do not impose an “undue burden” on a woman’s ability to 
choose to terminate.11  Under this framework, a law will not withstand 
constitutional scrutiny where its “purpose or effect is to place a substantial 
 
7  The prominent anti-abortion law reform group Americans United for Life has led draft 
legislation efforts in this area as part of its “women-protection project.”  See Americans United for Life, 
“Women’s Protection Project,” http://www.aul.org/womens-protection-project/.  However, state officials 
have also made public announcements in which they have celebrated these regulations as having 
expressly anti-abortion aims.  See Karen McVeigh, Rick Perry Signs Wide-ranging Texas Bill to Limit 
Access to Abortion, GUARDIAN (July 18, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/18/rick-
perry-texas-abortion-bill (When signing Texas House Bill 2 into law, Governor Rick Perry said, “it is a 
very happy, celebratory day.  This is an important day for those who support life and for those who 
support the health of Texas women.  In signing House Bill 2, we celebrate and further cement the 
foundation on which the culture of life in Texas is built.”). 
8  After Texas introduced its admitting-privileges requirement, the number of abortion facilities 
dropped by half and the number of reproductive age women living more than fifty miles from a clinic 
doubled. Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 681–82 (W.D. Tex. 2014); see Caitlin 
Gerdts et al., Impact of Clinic Closures on Women Obtaining Abortion Services After Implementation of 
a Restrictive Law in Texas, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 857, 860–61 (2016) (The Texas Evaluation Project 
found that twenty-five percent of women whose nearest clinic closed with the introduction of these 
requirements lived more than 139 miles from a facility and ten percent lived more than 256 miles 
away.). 
9  Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016); see Act of July 18, 2013, 2013 
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4795–4802 (West) (codified at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 171.0031, 
171.041–048, 171.061–064, 245.010–011 (West 2015)); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. §§ 164.052, 164.055 
(West 2015)). 
10  Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
11  Id. at 878.  After viability, the balance shifts markedly in favor of the state interest in 
protecting fetal life.  Casey reaffirmed that post-viability the state can regulate to the point of prohibition 
so long as it provides for an exception to preserve the life or health of the woman. 
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obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion” before fetal viability.12 
Against this backdrop, how should reviewing courts assess regulations 
that reduce abortion services and thereby force women to travel ever longer 
distances to access care?13  This question deeply divides American abortion 
jurisprudence today.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit, for example, has given inconsistent guidance, treating abortion 
travel as an incidental private burden of choice in one case, and as 
impermissible state outsourcing of constitutional obligations onto 
neighboring states in another.14  Still other courts and parties have 
attempted to draw arbitrary geographic lines—for example, 150 miles from 
a woman’s home, as obliquely referenced by the Supreme Court in Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey—below which travel would not constitute an “undue 
burden” on the abortion right.15 
Most recently, in Whole Woman’s Health, the Supreme Court found 
that travel burdens flowing from clinic closures contributed to an undue 
burden, but only when taken into account with other factors.  Justice 
Breyer, writing for the majority, described women traveling long distances 
to access crammed facilities—a vision of industrial service, rather than 
individualized care.16  Even here, however, the Court held that increased 
travel alone would not always constitute an “undue burden.”17 
Why does travel remain such a vexing issue for the constitutional law 
of abortion? I argue in this paper that contests over abortion travel raise 
 
12  Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833. 925 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, 
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). For leading accounts of the meaning of the 
Casey framework and its application to contemporary challenges to abortion laws, see Reva B. Siegel, 
Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L. J. 1694 
(2008); Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 6. 
13  For a discussion of the ways in which restrictive abortion policies exclude and stigmatize 
women, see Joanna Erdman, The Law of Stigma, Travel and the Abortion-Free Island, 33 COLUM. J. 
GEN. & L. 29 (2016). On the stigmatizing effects of criminal abortion restrictions, see Rebecca J. Cook, 
Stigmatized Meanings of Criminal Abortion Law, in ABORTION LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE: 
CASES AND CONTROVERSIES 347 (Rebecca J. Cook, Joanna N. Erdman, & Bernard M. Dickens eds. 
2014). For a discussion of the meaning and significance of “abortion secrecy,” see CAROL SANGER, 
ABOUT ABORTION: TERMINATING PREGNANCY IN TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY AMERICA 46–69 (2017). 
14  Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 760 F. 3d 448, 457–58 (5th Cir. 2014); Lakey, 46 F. 
Supp. 3d at 681–82; see also Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Schimel, 806 F.3d 908 (2015). 
15  Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surg. 
Health Servs. v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583, 598 (5th Cir. 2014). 
16  Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2313 (2016) (“More fundamentally, 
in the face of no threat to women’s health, Texas seeks to force women to travel long distances to get 
abortions in crammed-to-capacity super facilities. Patients seeking these services are less likely to get 
the kind of individualized attention, serious conversation, and emotional support that doctors at less 
taxed facilities may have offered. Healthcare facilities and medical professionals are not fungible 
commodities.”). 
17  Id. (“We recognize that increased driving distances do not always constitute an ‘undue 
burden.’”). 
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profound distributive questions about class, race, age, citizenship, sex, and 
the terms of reproduction in America.18  From the pre-Roe era through the 
present, travel remains a key means by which class and geography define 
abortion access in the United States.  Women’s ability to travel in 
circumstances where abortion services are limited—to “chas[e] abortion 
rights across . . . state line[s],” as Linda Greenhouse recently described it—
functions as a safety valve.19 It offers choice to those who can afford to 
travel, while preserving restrictions on those who cannot.  At the same time, 
through the act of exile, women and families become “reproductive 
refugees,” in the words of Melissa Murray, Glen Cohen, and Jessie Hill, for 
whom travel embodies a punitive logic of exclusion.20  For those women 
and girls unable to undertake abortion journeys, travel functions not as an 
act of banishment, but as a hard barrier to access. 
These questions of punishment and political economy are critical to 
understanding the contested legal status of abortion travel in the United 
States today.  My aim is not to elaborate a unified vision of abortion travel.  
Neither its disparate judicial treatment, nor its myriad meanings and 
consequences in practice, would permit doing so.  Instead, I seek to 
disaggregate travel as a factor in law and politics, and show how mobility 
performs distinct work with varied outcomes for different actors within the 
system. 
Part I analyzes the burden and choice discourse that courts and parties 
have relied upon to both challenge and defend regulations that would 
require women to travel to access abortion services.  I show how courts 
have struggled to decide political questions of resource distribution—
financial, legal, and logistical—through competing ideas of public versus 
private responsibility.  Part II analyzes abortion travel as a site of horizontal 
struggle between states over the meaning of mobility and federalism.  In 
response to constitutional challenges, states such as Mississippi and Texas 
have argued that abortion regulations do not constitute an “undue burden” 
because women can simply travel to neighboring states.  I show that beyond 
the question of individual burdens, interstate abortion travel tests the 
meaning of state obligations in a federal union.  Together, Parts I and II 
 
18  In theorizing the unique and enduring role of abortion in American political and cultural life, 
Carol Sanger has argued: “so many things are about abortion because abortion itself is about so many 
things.”  The subject of abortion is, in Sanger’s words, “an opaque slate” upon which citizens inscribe 
concerns not just about fetal personhood but about adolescent rights, state power, women’s equality, 
religious morality, and sexual norms.  See Carol Sanger, Talking About Abortion, 25 SOC. & LEG. STUD. 
651, 653 (2016). 
19  See Linda Greenhouse, Chasing Abortion Rights Across the State Line, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/24/opinion/chasing-abortion-rights-across-the-state-line.html. 
20  Brief for Law Professors Melissa Murray, I. Glenn Cohen, & B. Jessie Hill as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (No. 15-274), at *18. 
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demonstrate the distributive decisions at the center of abortion travel 
jurisprudence, both within and among states.  In Part III, I argue that 
constitutional adjudication alone will not resolve these distributive 
questions.  So long as courts continue to limit the abortion right in 
American law to preventing states from interfering with women’s 
decisions, geography and social class will remain defining elements of 
access.  To this end, reproductive justice initiatives aimed at addressing 
economic and geographic barriers to access are crucial.  Harkening back to 
pre-Roe activism, I conclude by discussing the efforts of grassroots 
reproductive justice groups to once again engage abortion travel as a site of 
individual and collective struggle.21 
 
AN INDIVIDUAL BURDEN OR CHOICE? 
 
In making the moral case for reproductive choice, abortion provider 
Dr. Willie Parker has emphasized the tenacity of the women who present 
before him.  “A woman who wants to terminate her pregnancy,” Dr. Parker 
writes, “has to make her decision in the context of a culture that shames her 
and, increasingly, within the constraints of laws that dramatically 
inconvenience her.”22  Mandatory waiting periods, compelled ultrasounds, 
and misleading informed consent scripts make the experience of obtaining 
an abortion distinct from comparable medical procedures.23  All of this 
assumes, of course, that the woman can physically get herself to a provider.  
When Dr. Parker began providing abortion services in 2002, there were 
twelve clinics in his home state of Alabama.  By 2017, only five remained.  
In neighboring Mississippi, as I discuss below, Dr. Parker works at the 
state’s last remaining clinic.  “To do abortion where the need is greatest is 
to be itinerant,” Dr. Parker observes, “always on the road, because the 
 
21  See, e.g., FUND TEXAS CHOICE, http://fundtexaschoice.org/ (providing financial assistance for 
transportation to and from the nearest abortion clinic and assists with finding accommodation during the 
trip to an abortion clinic); see also PLANNED PARENTHOOD SOUTH TEXAS, 
https://www.plannedparenthood.org/planned-parenthood-south-texas/patients/abortion-care-services/a- 
abortion-care-fund (“New laws have also forced many doctors in cities across Texas to stop providing 
abortion care.  This means women have to travel hundreds of miles several times to access safe, legal 
abortion.  We also have limited special financial assistance to help with travel expenses for women who 
have to travel more than 100 miles to get to our health center in San Antonio.  This assistance is also 
based on your income and family size.”). For a list of state funds that provide financial assistance with 
abortion services, see NATIONAL NETWORK OF ABORTION FUNDS, https://abortionfunds.org/need-
abortion/. 
22  WILLIE J. PARKER, LIFE’S WORK: A MORAL ARGUMENT FOR CHOICE 8 (2017). 
23  For an argument that state efforts to persuade women against terminating a pregnancy should 
be treated differently to laws that restrict access to the procedure, see Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 
6.  
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distances between the clinics are so great.”24  For both providers and 
women in the South and Midwest, travel is a key part of the contemporary 
abortion landscape. 
Reproductive rights advocates work to translate these stories of clinic 
closures and abortion travel into legal challenges to restrictive abortion 
regulations.  In doing so, they face a central question.  Are travel burdens 
merely private incidents of reproductive choice, and therefore beyond state 
responsibility?  Or is travel the logical consequence of restrictive 
regulations such that it constitutes—or at the very the least contributes to—
an “undue burden” on women’s constitutionally protected right to decide to 
terminate a pregnancy?  At stake in this analysis is more than the outcome 
of specific constitutional challenges.  Narrow and formalist understandings 
of state action and responsibility contribute to a political economy that 
privatizes abortion burdens, leaving poor, young, rural and overwhelmingly 
black and brown women to the vagaries of geography and the market.25  In 
contrast, drawing a direct line between travel and the regulations that 
produce abortion scarcity redistributes responsibility toward the state as part 
of the “undue burden” analysis.  Travel cases test liberal distinctions 
between public and private, and state versus individual responsibility.26 
Given these stakes, it is unsurprising that we see courts divided over 
the legal meaning and significance of abortion travel.  Reproductive rights 
advocates and defendant states translate these distributive struggles into 
legal arguments that they then call upon judges to resolve.  The reasoning 
often devolves into intensely fact-specific inquiries about mileage, gas, 
borders, and cost.  What distance constitutes an “undue burden” under 
Casey?  Should this distance analysis vary contextually according to 
women’s circumstances and resources?  Does travel constitute a discrete 
factor in the “undue burden” analysis or should courts consider it only in 
combination with other burdens? 
Whole Woman’s Health provides a recent, and particularly notable, 
example of these inquiries into whether and how courts should attribute 
travel burdens to state regulation or instead treat them as largely private 
costs.  In this Part, I highlight the ways in which advocates and courts 
struggled with the place of individualized circumstances, as expressed 
 
24  PARKER, supra note 22, at 5. 
25  For discussion of geography and judicial bias toward urban living, see Lisa R. Pruitt & Marta 
R. Vanegas, Urbanormativity, Spatial Privilege, and Judicial Blind Spots in Abortion Law, 30 
BERKELEY J. GEN. L. & JUST. 76 (2015). 
26  For discussion and critiques of the public/private distinction and its ideological significance, 
see Frances Olsen, Constitutional Law: Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Distinction, 10 CONST. 
COMM. 319 (1993); Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 
U. PENN. L. REV. 1349 (1982). 
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through travel, in the undue burden analysis.  Advocates and lower courts 
explored various solutions to this challenge, from weighing them directly to 
disregarding them entirely.  The decisions reveal that courts were most 
comfortable addressing the question obliquely, by commingling it into a 
more general undue burden analysis or into a facially objective standard, 
beginning with the question of distance. 
The arguments advanced by the parties and amicus briefs in Whole 
Woman’s Health reveal the material questions at the heart of debates over 
abortion travel.  Basing its arguments on its experience assisting women 
seeking abortions since the passage of the Texas law at issue, the National 
Abortion Federation (“NAF”) urged the Supreme Court in its amicus brief 
to assess the burdens that clinic closures and resultant travel would impose 
on specific classes of women.27Since the passage of H.B. 2, the NAF 
Hotline was flooded with calls from Texas women desperately seeking 
timely abortion care. Many women had to rely on limited public 
transportation or friends and family to travel to their appointments; others 
had to pawn or sell personal items, such as furniture or wedding rings, to 
pay for the additional costs.28  Their plight, NAF argued, should be at the 
center of the Court’s analysis of travel. 
Still others urged the Court to consider the dignitary harms to women 
who are forced to leave their homes and travel long distances to access 
abortion care.  Legal scholars Melissa Murray, Glenn Cohen, and Jessie 
Hill argued that Texas was actively excluding women from their own 
political communities by relying on travel arguments to defend its law.29  
When the state regulates abortion in a way that requires women to pack 
their bags and travel far from home, it punishes them through the process.30  
This is not a mere incident of private choice, according to Murray, Cohen, 
and Hill, but state action that actively stigmatizes women seeking abortion 
care.  In contrast to situations where people may exercise their “own 
judgment and deliberation” to travel for complex or experimental treatment, 
abortion travel is “the product of state-imposed regulations that make 
routine medical care unavailable at home.”31  The state creates the need for 
travel and, in doing so, makes the experience of accessing a very common 
 
27  Brief for National Abortion Federation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 17–
18,Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (No. 15-274). 
28  Id. 
29  Brief for Law Professors Melissa Murray, I. Glenn Cohen, & B. Jessie Hill as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (No. 15-274), at *13. 
30  See CAROL SANGER, ABOUT ABORTION: TERMINATING PREGNANCY IN TWENTY-FIRST-
CENTURY AMERICA (2017) (discussing the ways in which the onerous procedural hurdles to access 
abortion operate as a form of punishment). 
31  Brief for Law Professors Melissa Murray, I. Glenn Cohen, & B. Jessie Hill as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (No. 15-274), at *13. 
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medical procedure both difficult and exceptional.  Laws that single out 
abortion for onerous regulation, Murray, Cohen, and Hill argued to the 
Court, “announce that women seeking abortion are unworthy and unequal 
in the eyes of the law.”32 
While these briefs provided a thick account of state responsibility for 
limiting abortion care, the anti-abortion organization Live Action presented 
arguments at the other end of the spectrum.  It presented a classical, 
negative rights framework focused on individual choice and the absence of 
a public responsibility for individual circumstances.  Equating abortion with 
any other elective procedure, and abortion providers with any other 
industry, Live Action argued in its amicus brief: 
The state has no constitutional responsibility to ensure that 
every patient has low-cost transportation, an elimination of 
wait time, or short travel to every elective medical 
procedure. Meeting the business interests of the abortion 
industry is hardly the duty of the state.33 
On this view, the fact that women may have to travel long distances is 
a private burden they must bear, not a public responsibility of the state.  
The brief did not acknowledge the fact that the petitioners were challenging 
state regulation that was producing market scarcity in the first place. 
These competing visions of public responsibility and private choice 
animated the judicial response to travel in Whole Woman’s Health from the 
Fifth Circuit to the Supreme Court.  In upholding H.B. 2, the Fifth Circuit 
used formalist reasoning to exclude questions of poverty and hardship from 
its constitutional review.  “It found conditions of class or precarious 
employment to be irrelevant to the “undue burden” analysis because the 
impugned law did not itself create those conditions.34  In overturning the 
district court on this point, the  Fifth Circuit wrote:  
In reaching its conclusion that H.B. 2’s requirements 
imposed an undue burden on a significant number of 
women, the district court also found that travel distances 
combined with the following practical concerns to create a 
de facto barrier to abortion for some women: “lack of 
availability of child care, unreliability of transportation, 
unavailability of appointments at abortion facilities, 
unavailability of time off from work, immigration status 
and inability to pass border checkpoints, poverty level, the 
 
32  Id. at *15. 
33  Brief of Live Action as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 34, Whole Woman’s 
Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015), (No. 15-274) 2016 WL 537541. 
34  Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015). 
03-KELLY 4.24.2017.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/17  6:09 PM 
36 FIU Law Review [Vol. 12:27 
time and expense involved in traveling long distances, and 
other, inarticulable psychological obstacles.” On this point, 
we agree with the motions panel majority: “We do not 
doubt that women in poverty face greater difficulties. 
However, to sustain a facial challenge, the Supreme Court 
and this circuit require Plaintiffs to establish that the law 
itself imposes an undue burden on at least a large fraction 
of women. Plaintiffs have not done so here.”35 
The Fifth Circuit held that the material hardships of travel for poor, 
young, migrant, and rural women should not figure into the “undue burden” 
analysis because H.B. 2 had not itself created those conditions.  It merely 
mapped onto them.  The Fifth Circuit deemed the distributive effects of 
H.B. 2 to be “private”—not of the law’s making—and therefore outside 
constitutional review. 
However, in advancing this formalist position, the Fifth Circuit did not 
hold questions of travel to be completely outside constitutional review. 
Instead, it endorsed a bright-line rule that would apply to all women, 
thereby making distance and not individual or group circumstances the 
primary criterion for constitutionality.  It based this rule on an oblique 
reference in Casey to nearby providers.  The Fifth Circuit held that so long 
as even a single provider remained within a 150-mile radius of a woman’s 
residence, no substantial obstacle existed, regardless of the number of 
women who might be dependent on that single provider.36 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the petitioners attacked the Fifth 
Circuit’s distance-based rule and the formalist reasoning underpinning it.  
The petitioners argued that the Fifth Circuit ignored Casey as a precedent 
by paying insufficient attention to individual circumstances, particularly 
among those who would be most adversely impacted by abortion scarcity:  
This “150-mile” bright-line rule cannot be reconciled with 
this Court’s precedents. In Casey, for example, the Court 
held that the spousal notification requirement created a 
substantial obstacle to abortion access in part because 
married women who experienced domestic violence were 
“likely to be deterred from procuring an abortion” by fear 
that the required notification would trigger violence against 
themselves or their children. The Court explained that 
“[w]e must not blind ourselves” to the practical impact of 
the law on women in abusive marriages. But the Fifth 
Circuit’s logic would compel courts to do exactly that 
 
35  Id. at 589. 
36  Id. 
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because the law itself did not create those abusive 
relationships.37 
While the Court in Casey concerned itself with the subset of women 
who might experience violence if forced to notify their spouses, the Fifth 
Circuit refused to take personal circumstances into account in setting a 
bright-line rule.  As the United States argued in its amicus brief supporting 
the petitioners, Casey seemed to call upon courts to consider precisely the 
kinds of individual circumstances the Fifth Circuit ignored, with a particular 
emphasis on vulnerable groups directly affected by the government action 
at issue.38  The United States argued that the Fifth Circuit had erred in 
considering all women of reproductive age in Texas instead of just those 
who would have to travel long distances.39 
The challenge for the petitioners was to convince the Court the 
analogy to Casey was apposite.  This was a steep, uphill battle.  It is 
certainly true that Casey took into account the specific impact that spousal 
notification laws would have on married women whose husbands might 
abuse them.  However, it was arguably easier for the Court to consider 
individual circumstances of spousal violence in Casey than it would be to 
confront questions of class, geography, and migrant status in Whole 
Woman’s Health.  What makes travel cases hard is that they raise 
foundational questions about the meaning of public responsibility versus 
private choice in abortion law. 
The Supreme Court in Whole Woman’s Health largely deflected these 
questions.  Despite being central to the case, Justice Breyer devoted only 
two full sentences to travel in his forty-page opinion for the Court.  He 
wrote: 
We recognize that increased driving distances do not 
always constitute an “undue burden.” See Casey, 505 U. S., 
at 885–887 (joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and 
Souter, JJ.). But here, those increases are but one additional 
burden, which, when taken together with others that the 
closings brought about, and when viewed in light of the 
virtual absence of any health benefit, lead us to conclude 
that the record adequately supports the District Court’s 
“undue burden” conclusion.40 
 
37  Brief of Petitioner at 50–51, Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, No. 15-274 (5th Cir. Oct. 5, 
2015) (citations omitted). 
38  Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 30–31, Whole Woman’s 
Health v. Cole, 790 F. 3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015), (No. 15-274), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/United-States.pdf. 
39  Id. 
40  Whole Woman’s Health, supra note 9, at 2298 (emphasis added). 
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The majority treated travel here as simply one of several burdens to be 
considered together.  This rendered travel a relevant but indeterminate 
factor in constitutional review.  Justice Breyer confirmed that increased 
travel alone would not necessarily give rise to an “undue burden” finding.  
Instead, the majority incorporated travel into its benefit-burden analysis, 
having already found that the costs of H.B. 2 clearly outweighed any 
putative benefits. 
Commentators and advocates have rightly celebrated the evidence-
based thrust of Whole Woman’s Health.  Linda Greenhouse and Reva 
Siegel have commended “Justice Breyer’s unusually close examination of 
the facts” as modeling “a kind of scrutiny that few TRAP laws could 
withstand.”41  By holding states accountable for the actual effects of their 
laws rather than their colorable purposes, the Court helped to clarify “what 
counts as a benefit and a burden to be balanced within the Casey 
framework.”42  Moreover, the dispassionate style with which Justice Breyer 
weighed these costs and benefits arguably worked to normalize abortion as 
a matter of constitutional review.43  In stark contrast to the graphic account 
of surgical abortion provided by Justice Kennedy in Gonzales v. Carhart, 
Justice Breyer presented a “matter-of-fact description of abortion as a 
medical procedure.”44  As Carol Sanger writes, the Court took seriously 
“the quality of medical care for pregnant women” in weighing the costs of 
clinic closures against the absence of any health benefits of hospital 
privileges and ambulatory surgical center requirements.45  Whole Woman’s 
Health is powerful in part because it’s ultimately banal. 
Despite this indisputable victory for reproductive rights advocates, 
Whole Woman’s Health did not provide clear answers about access.  In 
rejecting a 150-mile distance rule, the Court ultimately treated travel as an 
indeterminate factor to be weighed among others as part of the “undue 
burden” analysis.  In future cases, if advocates cannot reliably point to state 
laws and policies as the public cause of clinic closures, travel barriers may 
simply be treated as private burdens.  In other words, the Court left intact 
the distinction between public and private responsibility in American 
abortion law. 
 
41  Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, The Difference a Whole Woman Makes: Protection for 
the Abortion Right After Whole Woman’s Health, 126 YALE L. J. F. 149 (2016). 
42  Id. 
43  Some commentators have drawn parallels between Justice Breyer’s use of cost-benefit 
analysis in administrative law and Whole Woman’s Health.  See Noah Feldman, Justices Haven’t Ended 
Abortion Restrictions Yet, BLOOMBERG VIEW (July 5, 2016, 12:30 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-07-05/supreme-court-hasn-t-ended-abortion-restrictions 
-yet. 
44  SANGER, ABOUT ABORTION, supra note 13 at 236. 
45  Id. 
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As I discuss in the following Part, these questions of state 
responsibility inform not only vertical struggles between individual women 
and their states but also horizontal struggles between states in the federal 
union. 
 
ABORTION TRAVEL IN A FEDERAL UNION 
 
Shortly after his election victory, President-elect Donald Trump 
affirmed his commitment to a “pro-life” politics and judiciary.46  Asked 
whether he wished the Supreme Court to overturn Roe v. Wade, he simply 
responded that if the decision were overruled, the question of abortion 
“would go back to the states.”47  For women living in states that chose to 
restrict or prohibit abortion, travel would be their recourse.  “Yeah, well,” 
Trump speculated, “they’ll perhaps have to go, they’ll have to go to another 
state.”48 
In treating abortion as properly the subject of state authority, 
President-elect Trump tacitly endorsed the distributive compromise that 
existed prior to Roe.  Women living in permissive states, as well as those 
with the means to travel to permissive states, would remain able to access 
abortion.49  Those without these financial or geographic advantages would 
either have to either carry unwanted pregnancies to term or attempt 
clandestine or self-induced terminations. 
One need not imagine a return to the pre-Roe days of outright 
prohibition to see how geography, class, and race remain organizing 
features of abortion access across the United States today.  As the so-called 
“abortion desert” expands across the South and the Midwest, many women 
must travel to neighboring states to access abortion care.50  Since 2014, five 
 
46  See Emily Schultheis, Trump talks to “60 Minutes” about same-sex marriage, abortion and 
the Supreme Court, CBS NEWS (Nov. 3, 2016), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-promises-pro-life-
justices-supreme-court-same-sex-marriage/. 
47  Id. 
48  Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 13, Whole Woman’s 
Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015), (No. 15-274), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/United-States.pdf. 
49  New York State legalized abortion in 1970, three years prior to Roe, and became a primary 
destination for women from other states seeking legal abortions.  See Ted Joyce, Ruoding Tan & Yuxiu 
Zhang, Abortion Before & After Roe, 32 J. HEALTH & ECON. 804 (2013). 
50  See Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Crossing the ‘Abortion Desert’: Women Increasingly Travel out 
of Their States for the Procedure, L.A. TIMES (June 2, 2016, 3:30 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-adv-abortion-traveler-20160530-snap-story.html; see also Rachel 
K. Jones & Jenna Jerman, Abortion Incidence and Service Availability In the United States, 2011, 46 
PERSPECTIVES ON SEX. & REPRO. HEALTH 3 (2014), https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/art- 
icle_files/abortion_incidence_in_the_united_states_2011.pdf (As of 2011, 89% of U.S. counties lacked 
an abortion clinic and 38% of reproductive age women lived in those counties); Caitlin Gerdts et al., 
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states—Mississippi, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, and 
Wyoming—have been left with only a single abortion clinic.51  Mississippi, 
in particular, has become a fierce battleground.  The Jackson Women’s 
Health Organization (“JWHO”), known colloquially as “the Pink House” 
because of its painted exterior, is the last remaining abortion clinic in the 
state.52 
In 2012, Mississippi passed a hospital privileges law that threatened to 
close JWHO.53  Mississippi House Bill 1390 required all physicians 
associated with an abortion facility to have admitting privileges at a local 
hospital.54 Several physicians at the JWHO sought admitting privileges at 
local hospitals, but the hospitals denied them, citing reasons related to the 
provision of abortion services.  Mississippi subsequently denied a waiver of 
the privileges requirement for these physicians and issued JWHO an official 
notice of a hearing to revoke its license.  The JWHO filed suit in JWHO v. 
Currier.55 
In response to this challenge, Mississippi argued that the privileges law 
was validly enacted based on the state’s police power to regulate health and 
safety.  It did not constitute an “undue burden” under Casey because 
women could travel to other states.56  Mississippi insisted that its citizens 
would still be able to access abortion services in Tennessee, Louisiana, or 
Alabama without facing an “undue burden” in the exercise of their 
constitutional right to choose abortion.57  In oral argument before the Fifth 
Circuit, Mississippi’s Attorney General contended that if the Court limited 
the undue burden analysis to the state’s own territory, it would restrict the 
police powers of smaller states.  “Going that direction would create a 
difference in the police power between a state like Texas,” the Attorney 
General argued, “which is a large state with many abortion providers and a 
state like Mississippi’s which is small and might have only a limited 
number of providers.”58  In other words, adopting a state-centric approach 
 
Impact of Clinic Closures on Women Obtaining Abortion Services After Implementation of a Restrictive 
Law in Texas, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 857, 860–61 (2016). 
51  See generally Jones & Jerman, supra note 45. 
52  For a discussion of a documentary film portrayal of the reproductive landscape in Mississippi, 
see Catie L’Heureux, Mississippi’s Last Abortion Clinic, Captured, N.Y. MAG. (June 6, 2016), 
http://nymag.com/thecut/2016/06/jackson-documentary-last-abortion-clinic-mississippi.html. 
53  MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-75-1(f) (2012). 
54  Id. 
55  Jackson Women’s Health v. Currier, U.S. District Court for Southern District of Mississippi 
(filed June 27, 2012). 
56  Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 940 F. Supp. 2d 146 (S.D. Miss. 2014). 
57  See Brief of Petitioner at 7, Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, No. 14-997 (5th Cir. 
2014). 
58  Oral Argument at 8:02, Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 760 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 
2014). 
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would leave some states with greater regulatory discretion than others 
because the market for abortion services within larger states would be better 
able to withstand regulation under such a model.  This would lead to 
inequality in the ability of states to regulate health and safety within their 
territories. 
The underlying premise of Mississippi’s interstate travel argument was 
that abortion is properly subject to state authority, with the practical 
realization of the abortion right left to the rest of the union.  Where these 
concepts conflict, the former must prevail, with travel acting as a 
constitutionally mitigating factor.  The “safety valve” of interstate travel 
thus emerges as the enduring mode of compromise, whether in the 
prohibitive criminal environment of Roe or the restrictive regulatory 
environment of today.  If the democratic majority in a state like Mississippi 
wishes to limit abortion through regulation, women can resist or dissent 
from this majority by moving or at least traveling to a more permissive 
state.59 
In addition to the direct consequences for women discussed in Part I, 
these arguments can be examined from two different but related 
standpoints: the practical consequence of regulatory externalities and the 
legal consequence on our understanding of state obligations.  Turning first 
to regulatory externalities, relying on an “exit” option imposes significant 
transaction costs on individual travelers and externalizes medical coverage 
costs to destination providers who may already face in-state backlogs.  In 
the latter case, interstate travel entails horizontal spillovers that have largely 
gone unnoticed in an abortion jurisprudence concerned with vertical 
relations between the state and individuals.60  For this reason, states such as 
 
59  This is a variation of the “exit” argument in federalism.  According to proponents of this view, 
“exit” can operate as an optimal check on the controlling power of majoritarian governments and allows 
people to realize their individual preferences.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 
893 (8th ed. 2001) (“[P]eople can sort themselves between states in accordance with their preference.  
The right to move to a different state supplements voting power in controlling the action of government 
officials.”); see also Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 
150 (1992) (“The great virtue of federalism is that it introduces an important measure of competition 
between governments.  Federalism works best where it is possible to vote with your feet.  The state that 
exploits its productive individuals runs the risk that they will take their business elsewhere.”). 
60  For important exceptions in the literature that focus on the federalism questions that abortion 
regulations raise, see Katherine Shaw & Alex Stein, Abortion, Informed Consent, and Regulatory 
Spillover, 92 IND. L. REV. 1, 53 (2016) (“Since Roe v. Wade, the struggle between women’s 
constitutional entitlement to abortion and state power to regulate that entitlement has been 
conventionally understood to proceed along vertical lines.  The states’ boundaries have demarcated the 
terrain on which abortion restrictions imposed by states have clashed with the reproductive freedom 
secured by the U.S. Constitution.”); Seth F. Kreimer, The Law of Choice and Choice of Law: Abortion, 
the Right to Travel, and Extraterritorial Regulation in American Federalism, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 451 
(1992) (arguing that states cannot constitutionally restrict citizens from traveling to other states to access 
services that are legal in the receiving state). 
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New York have argued against permitting states to rely on interstate travel 
to defend onerous regulations.  In its amicus brief in Whole Woman’s 
Health, New York State warned that if the Court gave its imprimatur to a 
patchwork analysis, “states would be able to shift to neighboring states the 
responsibility for protecting access to abortion services, and thereby strain 
the healthcare systems of those States.”61  The City of New York similarly 
urged the Supreme Court to reject Texas’ reliance on interstate travel in that 
case, recalling its history as a safe haven for women seeking abortions from 
across the country in the years preceding Roe.  New York hospitals and 
clinics were overwhelmed at the time and many women had to wait over six 
weeks to get an appointment.62  In other regulatory contexts, including 
environmental pollution, downwind states may call for federal intervention 
to combat under-regulation by upwind states.  Abortion travel presents a 
unique case in which receiving states appeal for federal judicial intervention 
to mitigate the effects of over-regulation by sending states, a phenomenon 
that remains largely unexamined and unresolved.63 
Beyond this question of interstate externalities, the “exit” argument 
assumes that abortion is the type of good or service properly subject to state 
authority in a federal union.  To put it in economic terms, this view suggests 
that women should “sort” themselves by traveling from restrictive 
jurisdictions to permissive ones.64  Restrictive states can regulate abortion 
clinics to the point of closure so long as they allow demand to flow to other 
states.  In other words, states such as Mississippi and Texas aim to translate 
the de facto “safety valve” that existed before Roe into a de jure defense of 
restrictive abortion regimes today under the “undue burden” standard of 
Casey. 
In JWHO v. Currier, the Fifth Circuit firmly rejected this line of 
reasoning.  In doing so, it breathed life into a federal understanding of state 
 
61   Brief for New York State as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Whole Woman’s Health v. 
Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (No. 15-274), at *33. 
62   Brief for City of New York as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Whole Woman’s Health 
v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (No. 15-274), at *6–*12. 
63   See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-
Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1222 (1992) (“The 
presence of interstate externalities is a powerful reason for intervention at the federal level: because 
some of the benefits of a state’s pollution control policies accrue to downwind states, states have an 
incentive to underregulate.”); Bruce L. Hay, Conflicts of Law and State Competition in the Product 
Liability System, 80 GEO. L. J. 617, 617 (1992) (“When states can pass laws whose costs are borne by 
outsiders, self-interested behavior by each makes all worse off.”). 
64  Tiebout sorting refers to the sorting of households in and across neighborhoods according to 
residents’ ability and willingness to pay for local public goods.  The hypothesis suggests that people will 
publicly express and maximize their preferences by “voting with their feet.”  See C.M. Tiebout, A Pure 
Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).  Abortion travel is of course a more 
temporary form of “sorting,” although the idea of household choice could in theory track abortion 
regulation. 
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obligations in the abortion context that other courts have since followed.  
The Fifth Circuit held that the constitutional protections that attach to the 
abortion decision make a meaningful difference in the outsourcing analysis.  
Writing for a two-member majority, Judge Grady Jolly held that Mississippi 
may not “shift its obligations to respect the established constitutional rights 
of its citizens to another state.”65  The Fifth Circuit held that not only did 
Mississippi’s privileges law unduly burden its own citizens, its reliance on 
interstate travel would violate its constitutional compact with other states in 
the union.  The Court wrote: 
Such a proposal would not only place an undue burden on 
the exercise of the constitutional right, but would also 
disregard a state’s obligation under the principle of 
federalism—applicable to all fifty states—to accept the 
burden of the non-delegable duty of protecting the 
established federal constitutional rights of its own 
citizens.66 
The Fifth Circuit framed abortion travel as an issue of both vertical (state-
individual) and horizontal (state-state) constitutional review.  
In reaching this conclusion, the Court invoked an earlier chapter in 
American federalism in which states similarly relied upon—indeed, 
compelled—interstate travel by their citizens.  Judge Grady drew a parallel 
between state reliance on travel as part of Jim Crow segregation and 
contemporary reliance on interstate travel to insulate stringent abortion 
regimes. 
In Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada (1938), the NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund challenged a Missouri scheme that denied African Americans 
access to in-state graduate or professional training and instead offered them 
out-of-state tuition grants.67  Southern and border states began enacting 
these plans during the interwar years as more African Americans secured 
high school and undergraduate diplomas.68  As legal historian Michael 
Klarman has noted, out-of-state tuition programs were woefully inadequate, 
covering tuition but not travel or living expenses.  “The legal question,” 
Klarman wrote, “was when those differences rose to the level of 
unconstitutional inequality.”69  In Gaines, the Supreme Court held that they 
 
65  Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 760 F. 3d 448, 448 (5th Cir. 2014). 
66  Id. 
67  Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). On the history of the Gaines case, see 
Kevin M. Kruse, Personal Rights, Public Wrongs: The Gaines Case and the Beginning of the End of 
Segregation, 22 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 113 (1997). 
68  See MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY, 148 (2004). 
69  Id. at 149 (emphasis added). 
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had in the case of Missouri.  Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Charles 
Evans Hughes insisted that the constitutional inquiry should focus not on 
what sorts of educational opportunities other states might offer, but on what 
opportunities Missouri denied black students on account of their race.  The 
Court held that states could not shirk their constitutional obligations in 
reliance on their neighbors.  Each state, Chief Justice Hughes wrote, is 
“responsible for its own laws establishing the rights and duties of persons 
within its borders,” and “it is an obligation the burden of which cannot be 
cast by one state upon another, and no state can be excused from 
performance by what another state may do or fail to do.”70 
The Fifth Circuit in Jackson v. Currier revived Gaines.  In forceful 
language that placed responsibility at Mississippi’s own doorstep, the Court 
insisted that Gaines “locks the gate for Mississippi to escape to another 
state’s protective umbrella and thus requires us to conduct the undue burden 
inquiry by looking only at the ability of Mississippi women to exercise their 
right within Mississippi’s borders.”71  This was a stinging rebuke to the 
“exit” argument, at least in the case of a state with only one remaining 
clinic. 
Other courts have since followed Jackson v. Currier, relying in part on 
Gaines for the proposition that states cannot rely on out-of-state access to 
cure in-state constitutional infirmities.  In Planned Parenthood v. Strange, 
an Alabama district court enjoined a hospital privileges law and rejected 
state claims that interstate travel should figure into the constitutional 
“undue burden” analysis.72  Judge Myron Thompson noted that interstate 
reliance claims had failed across a spectrum of constitutional rights. 
The court must acknowledge that state boundaries are not 
always significant in women’s real-world decision-making. 
On the other hand, the State could identify no precedent for 
a court to consider conduct outside the political boundaries 
of a jurisdiction in order to justify the constitutionality of 
actions by that jurisdiction. On the contrary, in areas 
ranging from First Amendment free speech to Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection to Second Amendment 
firearm rights, courts have refused to allow out-of-
jurisdiction access to cure within-jurisdiction restrictions.73  
 
70  Gaines, 305 U.S. at 350. 
71  Id. 
72  Planned Parenthood S.E., Inc. v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330 (M.D. Ala. 2014) (enjoining a 
hospital privileges law for abortion providers). 
73  Id. (citing Schad v. Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (free speech); Gaines, 305 U.S. at 337 
(equal protection); Ezell v. Chicago, 651 F. 3d 684, 689–90, 697 (7th Cir. 2011) (firearm rights); Islamic 
Ctr. of Miss., Inc. v. Starkville, 840 F. 2d 293, 298–99 (5th Cir. 1988) (free exercise)). 
03-KELLY 4.24.2017.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/17  6:09 PM 
2016] Abortion Travel and the Limits of Choice 45 
Judge Thompson acknowledged that from the perspective of the 
woman herself, crossing state lines may or may not figure into real world 
decision-making.  Women living in border towns may be able to access out-
of-state clinics more easily than in-state clinics.  However, from the 
perspective of the state, asking courts to ignore territoriality in 
constitutional review is legerdemain: territorial lines are constitutive of its 
very claim to authority and, reciprocally, demarcate its sphere of 
constitutional responsibility. 
While this line of abortion travel jurisprudence should be encouraging 
to progressives, federalism arguments also offer an only potential answer to 
material problems of access.  One reason is that federalism claims may 
depend on a state’s expressed arguments and intent in describing challenged 
legislation.  Where states have not expressed a wish to rely on other states 
to discharge their constitutional obligations, facially neutral regulations may 
survive scrutiny.  However, an even more central reason for this deficiency 
is that requiring states to discharge their own constitutional duties can only 
advance the limited abortion right as defined in the case law.  I discuss 
these limitations in the following Part. 
 
III. ABORTION TRAVEL AND REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE 
 
Travel poses a unique challenge for reproductive rights advocates in 
the United States because the constitutional jurisprudence from Roe through 
Casey has never held that states have positive duties to facilitate women’s 
access to abortion, locally or otherwise.74  As Robin West has emphasized, 
Roe v. Wade did not recognize a positive right to abortion; it enshrined a 
negative right against some forms of prohibition in some circumstances.75  
Consistent with this logic, the Supreme Court confirmed in Harris v. 
McRae that the abortion right does not impose positive funding obligations 
on the state.76  Likewise, the Court concerned itself in Planned Parenthood 
v. Casey with impermissible burdens that states may not place in a woman’s 
decision-making path, rather than with positive measures that the state must 
undertake to facilitate abortion access.77  Even as academic commentators 
 
74  For an early and trenchant critique of the negative abortion right, in particular the extent to 
which it leaves women subject to the “privacy” of the market and home, see CATHARINE A. 
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 184 (1989); see also Robin West, From 
Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-Constitutionalizing Abortion Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 1394, 1403 
(2009) (arguing that the negative and individualist abortion right from Roe onwards is at odds with a 
more capacious reproductive justice agenda). 
75  Id. 
76  Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
77  Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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and courts have articulated varying grounds for the right—from privacy to 
liberty to women’s equality—its largely negative scope has endured. 
Feminist theorists have long emphasized the tensions inherent in the 
Court’s choice in Roe to ground the abortion right in privacy.  Catharine 
MacKinnon famously argued that liberal privacy discourse has the dual 
effect of limiting state intrusion into the so-called private sphere while also 
constituting that very sphere as one “that is considered free by definition.”  
The consequence of this duality—two sides of the same coin, in 
MacKinnon’s words—is that conservatives can flip progressive claims that 
the state has a duty not to intervene to argue that the state has no duty to 
intervene. 78 
The same liberal logic of privacy that limits states from interfering in 
women’s reproductive choices routinely deprives women of the ability to 
claim public support in exercising those choices. Travel highlights this 
tension because its legal significance depends on the perspective from 
which one views it.  Outside of their material and legal circumstances, 
nothing directly stops women from traveling to other states to access 
abortion services; yet those very circumstances do, in concert with state 
regulations, effectively bar many women from travel. 
In retrospect, one may conclude that Roe achieved only a fragile 
balance that is now eroding as detractors exploit its vulnerabilities.  In view 
of the largely negative and individualist scope of the abortion right in 
American law, abortion travel remains an obstacle that constitutional 
adjudication alone is unlikely to resolve.79  In the absence of a judicial 
reconceptualization of the abortion right and as antiabortion advocates and 
politicians work to reinstate a fragmented pre-Roe landscape of abortion 
deserts, reproductive rights advocates must also revive pre-Roe strategies 
and tactics.  The problem requires a renewed emphasis on reproductive 
justice to address the social inequalities and collective issues that continue 
to exist within the prevailing reproductive rights framework. 
In recent years, reproductive justice groups have worked to address 
these gaps by assisting women with organizing and funding abortion 
journeys.  Fund Texas Choice, founded in response to Texas HB-2, assists 
women living in rural and low-income areas to travel for abortion care.80  
Even following the victory by reproductive rights groups in Whole 
Woman’s Health, many clinics that closed in Texas have not reopened and 
others face significant logistical and financial burdens in attempting to do 
 
78 Id. 
79  See West, supra note 79. 
80  About Us, FUND TEXAS CHOICE, http://fundtexaschoice.org/about-us/. 
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so.81  Fund Texas Choice reports that the average number of trips it has 
assisted with has tripled from 2014 to 2016.82  In 2013, the National 
Abortion Federation hotline referred 21 Texans to New Mexico; two years 
later, that number had grown to 209.83 
These efforts to facilitate abortion access reconceive the act of abortion 
travel.  Through these initiatives, travel becomes an expression of collective 
will to secure reproductive justice for all women, and no longer merely an 
individual undertaking of stigmatized exile from one’s home jurisdiction.  
In doing so, activists work to resolve MacKinnon’s critique of the abortion 
right, bringing private struggles into the public sphere.84 
Indeed, prior to Roe, abortion referral and travel networks formed a 
key part of broader feminist advocacy for the liberalization of abortion laws 
in the United States.  In 1966, Patricia Maginnis helped to found the Society 
for Humane Abortion, later known as the Association to Repeal Abortion 
Laws, one of the first open abortion referral services in the country.85  
Maginnis viewed abortion referrals and travel as necessary and direct 
confrontation with restrictive abortion laws.  Maginnis traveled to Tijuana, 
Mexico, where she visited local doctors providing abortions.  She 
developed a list of the safest providers and returned to busy street corners in 
San Francisco where she distributed the lists to women.86  Like their 
contemporary counterparts, these grassroots travel projects aimed to 
politicize and democratize abortion access. 
 
81  Id.; see Paul J. Weber, Texas May Not Restore Lost Abortion Clinics Despite Ruling, U.S. 
NEWS (June 28, 2016) (citing obstacles to reopening clinics including leasing, staffing, and equipment 
funding; Amy Hagstrom Miller, founder of Whole Woman’s Health, which operates a number of 
abortion clinics in Texas, stated after the Supreme Court victory, “we really have a daunting task to 
determine whether and how we can reopen our health centers”); see Kelli Garcia, Chipping Away at Roe 
in Texas and Beyond, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR. (Jan. 19, 2016); Brief for Petitioners at 23–24, Whole 
Woman’s Health v. Cole, 136 S. Ct. 499 (2015) (No. 15-274); see also Madeline Gomez, More Than 
Mileage: The Preconditions of Travel and the Real Burdens of H.B. 2, 33 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 49, 
50 (2016). 
82  See Miranda Bryant, “Abortion Travel Agent” from Texas Tells How She Helps Pregnant 
Women Get to One of the Few Clinics in the State That Still Offer the Procedure, as She Admits Demand 
for Her Services is Soaring, DAILY MAIL (Feb. 1, 2017, 7:25 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/ar 
ticle-4182080/Abortion-travel-agent-helps-women-access-Texas-clinics.html. 
83  See Molley Henessy-Fiske, Crossing the “Abortion Desert”: Women Increasingly Travel Out 
of Their States for the Procedure, L.A. TIMES (June 2, 2016). 
84  See Joanna N. Erdman, The Law of Stigma, Travel and the Abortion-Free Island, 33 COLUM. 
J. GEN. & L. 29, 34 (2016); Yasmine Ergas, The Law of Others: Mandating “Rights Through Travel” 
Between Discrimination, Moral Hazard, and Irrationality, 33 COLUM. J. GENDER & L 38, 38 (2016). 
85  Interview by Jeannette Cheek with Patricia Maginnis, Reminiscences of Patricia Maginnis, 
Oral History (1975); see Leslie J. Reagan, Crossing the Borders for Abortions: California Activists, 
Mexican Clinics, and the Creation of a Feminist Health Agency in the 1960s, 26 FEMINIST STUD. 323 
(2000). 
86  See LAWRENCE LADER, ABORTION II: MAKING THE REVOLUTION (1973) (describing his 
meeting with Patricia Maginnis in 1966 and her efforts to publicize and politicize safe abortion access). 
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Contemporary reproductive justice groups have also mobilized travel 
narratives in an effort to develop more contextual constitutional rights 
jurisprudence and to produce generative politics at the local and state 
level.87  In its amicus brief in Whole Woman’s Health, the National Latina 
Institute for Reproductive Justice provided the Court with a number of 
interview accounts of the specific burdens facing Texan Latinas—including 
long-distance travel—as a result of H.B. 2.88  The Institute noted that many 
interviewees reported having to find childcare, take out high-interest payday 
loans, work overtime, risk losing their jobs, and withstand scrutiny about 
their lengthy absence.89  For undocumented women and families, the risk of 
detention at a permanent or tactical immigration checkpoint along the 100-
mile border zone can make travel impossible.90 
Rather than framing abortion as a matter of individual right, travel 
networks mobilize collective resources in order to secure real access for 
poor, rural, migrant, and young women, in the process revealing the 
material supports that women need to access abortion in the United States.  
The mission statement of the Mississippi Reproductive Freedom Fund 
“recognize[s] and affirm[s] the right to parent, not to parent, have access to 
full reproductive health care and education and to raise children in safe 
environments with full support.”91  Travel networks exemplify many of the 
political goals and grassroots tactics that reproductive justice activists have 
advocated since the movement came to prominence in the 1990s.92  Choice 
discourse has proven limited, as Dorothy Roberts notes, for “claiming 
public resources that most women need in order to maintain control over 
their bodies and their lives.”93 Travel networks work to bring women and 
 
87  For a discussion of the importance of reproductive stories in reproductive justice work, see 
Pamela D. Bridgewater, Legal Stories and the Promise of Problematizing Reproductive Rights, 21 L. & 
LITERATURE 402 (2009). 
88  Brief of National Latina Institute for Reproductive Health et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. 499 (2015) (No. 15-274). 
89  Id. 
90  Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP’s) 100-Mile Rule, ACLU; see also Madeline M. 
Gomez, Intersections at the Border: Immigration Enforcement, Reproductive Oppression and the 
Policing of Latina Bodies in the Rio Grande Valley, 30 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 84 (2015). 
91  About Us, MISSISSIPPI REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM FUND: REMOVING BARRIERS TO FULL 
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTHCARE—INCLUDING ABORTION, https://msreprofreedomfund.org/. 
92  The term “reproductive justice” was coined in 1994 by feminists of color who viewed 
reproductive struggles as part of broader contests over race, class, and gender.  Rather than focusing 
primarily or exclusively on abortion, reproductive justice advocates and commentators have advanced a 
more holistic vision of justice that includes parenting with dignity.  See Loretta J. Ross, Understanding 
Reproductive Justice, SISTERSONG WOMEN OF COLOR REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH COLLECTIVE (2006), 
https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/rrfp/pages/33/attachments/original/1456425809/Understanding_
RJ_Sistersong.pdf?1456425809; Zakiya Luna & Kristin Lukin, Reproductive Justice, 9 ANN. REV. L. & 
SOC. SCI. 327 (2013). 
93  Dorothy Roberts, Reproductive Justice, Not Just Rights, DISSENT (Fall 2015), 
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Despite the pleas of reproductive rights advocates, it remains uncertain 
the extent to which marginalized groups can rely on the “undue burden” 
analysis to safeguard abortion access in the face of prohibitive travel 
challenges.  Indeed, in the coming years, if social stigma, economic forces, 
and a dearth of abortion providers continue to force women living in the 
South and Midwest to travel vast distances to access abortion, it is far from 
clear that American constitutional law will vindicate their plight.  Yet, what 
is apparent is that this scenario is as realistic as it would be harmful, 
bringing the need for a renewed reproductive justice movement into focus. 
At this stage in American constitutional history, it would be naïve to 
think that distributive struggles over class, gender, immigration status and 
race at the root of the abortion travel debate will be resolved through 
adjudication alone.  This is particularly the case where other moral and 
philosophical questions loom large, as in the abortion debate.  If there is one 
conclusion to draw from the divergent and tentative treatment in the case 
law to date, it may be that the current reproductive rights framework is 
insufficient to resolve the issues surrounding abortion travel.  Needing a 
traditional concept of reproductive rights to provide a legal baseline, but 
requiring a reproductive justice approach to make those rights meaningful, a 
holistic approach to abortion travel currently sits at a crossroads between 




94  See West, supra note 69, at 1431–32 (discussing the benefits of local, democratic and 
pragmatic advocacy for reproductive justice as compared to constitutional rights adjudication). 
